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I.

INTRODUCTION

At the close of the United States Supreme Court's 1994 term,
Justice Clarence Thomas became the center of news media attention
for his important role as a prominent member of the Court's resurgent
conservative bloc. More frequently than in past terms, Thomas's
opinions articulated the conservative position for his fellow Justices. 1
According to one report, "The newly energized Thomas has shown
little hesitancy this term in leading the conservative charge." 2 Another
article referred to Thomas's "full-throated emergence as a distinctive
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1. This was true in both majority and dissenting opinions. For example, Thomas spoke on
behalf of the majority in adivided decision that permitted enforcement of waivers of exclusionary
provisions of plea-statement rules, United States v. Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. 797 (1995), and
rejected an Ex Post Facto Clause challenge to legislative changes that affected an inmate's parole
eligibility, California Dep't of Corrections v. Morales, 115 S.Ct. 1597 (1995). He represented
conservative dissenters in several cases, including O'Neal v. Aninch, 115 S. Ct. 992 (1995)
(defining "harmless error" for habeas purposes); City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, 115 S.Ct.
1776 (1995) (application of Fair Housing Act to city's local ordinance); United States Term
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995) (constitutionality of state-mandated term limits
for representatives in Congress); and Garlotte v. Fordice, 115 S.Ct. 1948 (1995) (mootness of
habeas petition for prisoner serving consecutive sentences).
2. Tony Mauro, Court's Move to the Right is Confirmed, U.S.A. TODAY, June 27, 1995, at
Al, A2.
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and articulate judicial voice." 3 Thomas's new prominence, assertiveness, and visibility have been attributed to his emergence from the
shadows of an infamous confirmation battle.4 As described by one
report, "[Thomas] has hit his stride this year after three years of what
some say was a healing period after a confirmation ordeal in which he
denied sexual harassment charges by Anita Hill."'
The emergence of Thomas as a prominent actor on the Supreme
Court may reflect, in part, conventional scholarly wisdom that at least
three terms are required for a new Justice to become assimilated into
the Court's decisionmaking processes.6 Because neophyte Justices
require a period of adjustment,7 scholars prefer to assess Justices'
initial performances after the new judicial officers have served for at
least three terms.8 In light of his four years of service and his publicly
recognized emergence as an important Justice, this is an appropriate
moment to analyze Justice Thomas's performance. Because Thomas
received close scrutiny from the Senate Judiciary Committee,9 his

3. David J. Garrow, On Race, It's Thomas v. An Old Ideal, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1995, at
El.
4. Thomas's nomination to the Supreme Court was confirmed in the United States Senate
by a vote of 52 to 48, one of the narrowest approval margins in history. R.W. Apple, Jr., Senate
Confirms Thomas, 52-48, Ending Week of Bitter Battle; 'Time for Healing,' Judge Says, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 16, 1991, at Al. The close vote was generated by a significant political controversy
when one of Thomas's former aides at the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alleged
that he had harassed her. See TIMOTHY M. PHELPS & HELEN WINTERNITZ, CAPITOL GAMES:
THE INSIDE STORY OF CLARENCE THOMAS, ANITA HILL, AND A SUPREME COURT
NOMINATION (Harper Perennial) (1993); JANE MAYER & JILL ABRAMSON, STRANGE JUSTICE:
THE SELLING OF CLARENCE THOMAS (1994).
5. Mauro, supra note 2, at A2.
6. For example, Justice Frank Murphy's biographer concluded that it took Murphy three
terms to become assimilated into the Court. J. Woodford Howard, Justice Murphy: The
Freshman Years, 18 VAND. L. REV. 473, 477 (1965).
7. According to Justice William Brennan,
One enters a new and wholly unfamiliar world when he joins the Supreme Court of the
United States, and this is as true of a Justice who comes from the federal court of
appeals as it is of a Justice, like me, who came from a state supreme court. I say
categorically that no prior experience, including prior judicial experience, prepares one
for the work of the Supreme Court. . . . The initial confrontation on the United States
Supreme Court with the astounding differences in function and character of role, and
the necessity for learning entirely new criteria for decisions, can be a traumatic
experience for the neophyte.
William J. Brennan, Jr., The National Court of Appeals: Another Dissent, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 473,
484 (1973).
8. See, e.g., John Scheb & Lee Ailshie, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor and the "Freshman
Effect," 69 JUDICATURE 9 (1985); Thea Rubin & Albert Melone, Justice Antonin Scalia: A First
Year Freshman Effect?, 72 JUDICATURE 98 (1988); Albert Melone, Revisiting the Freshman Effect
Hypothesis: The First Two Terms of Justice Anthony Kennedy, 74 JUDICATURE 6 (1990).
9. PHELPS & WINTERNITZ, supra note 4, at 197 ("For five days, beginning on September
10[, 1991], the Supreme Court nominee was subject to long hours of interrogation [by the Senate
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confirmation hearing testimony provides a useful reference point for
assessing his actual performance as a Justice."
This Article will examine Thomas's confirmation testimony on
issues such as voting rights, abortion, religion, criminal justice, and
affirmative action, and will compare this testimony with Justice
Thomas's Supreme Court record in these areas. This comparison will
show that significant aspects of Justice Thomas's confirmation
testimony are at odds with his decisions on the Supreme Court.

II.

THE CONFIRMATION HEARINGS
A.

Overview

Federal Appeals Court Judge Clarence Thomas appeared before
the Senate Judiciary Committee (the Committee) for five days of
testimony in September 1991. During these confirmation hearings to
become a Supreme Court Justice, some Senators accused Thomas of
running away from his record." Throughout his testimony, Thomas
"took pains, under intense and sometimes skeptical questioning by the
Senators, to qualify or disavow views he had forcefully and repeatedly
expressed during his years on the lecture circuit as the Reagan
Administration's top civil rights official." 12 Thomas was apparently
trying to avoid the confirmation problems experienced in 1987 by
Judge Robert Bork, 3 whose strident conservative record eventually

Judiciary Committee's members].").
10. Thomas's single year of service as a judge on the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
provided little evidence of his potential performance on the Supreme Court. Other than being
tough on criminal cases, "Thomas's D.C. Circuit opinions read as if they had been stripped of
controversy.... He also rarely expounded opinions from the bench." MAYER & ABRAMSON,
supra note 4, at 162-63.
11. For example, Senator Howard Metzenbaum said, "Judge Thomas's statements regarding
the abortion issue are simply not credible. He is asking millions of American women to ignore
everything he has ever said or done in relation to the issue of abortion." Excerpts From Remarks
by Members of the Senate Judiciary Panel on Thomas, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1991, at 8.
12. Linda Greenhouse, Etching a Portraitof Judge Thomas, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1991, at
28; see also PHELPS & WINTERNITZ, supra note 4, at 184:
But most of the quotes hurled at Thomas that day were not taken out of context. They
were his own words, if not always his own thoughts. And Clarence Thomas, coached
by [White House consultant Kenneth] Duberstein. was ready to disavow them if that's
what it took for him to get onto the Supreme Court. He was even willing to disavow
his intellectual mentor, Thomas Sowell, the academic economist whose writings attack
the liberal orthodoxies on discrimination ....
13. David Margolick, Confirmation Hearings: Questions to Thomas Fall Short of the Mark,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1991, at El, E5 ("Chastened by the defeat of the outspoken Robert H.
Bork, White House operatives (advising Thomas] have concluded that filibustering is preferable
to philosophizing, that obfuscation beats elucidation, that blank slates are better than full ones.").
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led to the defeat of his nomination to the Supreme Court.' 4 Prior to
his nomination to the high court, Thomas, like Bork, had made
speeches and written articles in which he espoused a conservative
ideology, often criticizing liberals, Congress, and the Supreme Court
for advocating or creating policies that he deemed undesirable for
American society. 15 At his confirmation hearings, when asked to
explain whether his speeches and writings were consistent with his
beliefs, Thomas either refused to respond to questions or disavowed his
previous positions, portraying himself as an open-minded moderate.16
In response to the apparent inconsistencies between Thomas's
prior speeches and writings and his confirmation testimony, Senator
Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts summed up his concerns about
Thomas's testimony:
Judge Thomas, I continue to have serious concern about your
nomination. In your speeches and articles, you have taken many
strong positions, but again and again you have asked this committee
to ignore the record you have compiled over a decade.
of Judge Thomas have become a major
The vanishing views
7
issue in these hearings.'

14. See ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE: HOW THE BORK NOMINATION
SHOOK AMERICA (1989).
15. Examples of Thomas's writings and speeches are as follows: Affirmative Action Goals
and Timetables: Too Tough? Not Tough Enough, 5 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 401 (1987); Towards

a Plain Reading of the Constitution-The Declaration of Independence in Constitutional Interpretation, 30 HoW. L.J. 691 (1987); Civil Rights as a Principle Versus Civil Rights as an Interest, in
DAVID BOAZ, ASSESSING THE REAGAN YEARS 391 (1988); Thomas Sowell and the Heritage of
Lincoln: Ethnicity and Individual Freedom, 8 LINCOLN L. REV. 7 (1988); The Higher Law
Background of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 12 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 63 (1989); Why Black Americans Should Look to Conservative Policies, Speech
given at The Heritage Foundation (June 18, 1987); The Modem Civil Rights Movement: Can
a Regime of Individual Rights and the Rule of Law Survive?, Speech given at the Tocqueville
Forum, Wake Forest University (Apr. 18, 1988).
An additional article of interest is a profile of Thomas: Juan Williams, A Question of
Fairness, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb. 1987, at 70.
16. See Neil Lewis, Thomas Declines Requests by Panelfor Abortion View, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
11, 1991, at Al, A23; Neil Lewis, High Court Nominee's Testimony Continues to Frustrate
Democrats, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1991, at Al, A19.
17. Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: HearingsBefore the Comm. on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 1, at 451-52 (1991) [hereinafter Confirmation Hearings]. Kennedy continued,
If nominees can blithely disavow controversial positions taken in the past, nominees can
say those positions are merely philosophical musings or policy views or advocacy. If we
permit them to dismiss views full of sound and fury as signifying nothing, we are
abdicating our constitutional role in the advise-and-consent process.
Id. at 452.
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Despite Senator Kennedy's doubts and those of some of his colleagues,
the full Senate eventually confirmed Clarence Thomas by a fifty-two
to forty-eight vote."
B.

Testimony ConcerningJudicial Orientation

During the confirmation hearings, Thomas gave an opening
statement and was questioned on a variety of topics, including the role
of natural law in constitutional adjudication, his general approach to
judging, the proper roles of the three branches of government, and
particularly his views on civil rights and liberties issues. 9 In the civil
rights and liberties area, the Committee questioned Thomas about his
views on the right of privacy, particularly abortion; First Amendment
issues, including the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses;
enforcement of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, particularly Title VII;
affirmative action; enforcement of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and
relevant Supreme Court decisions; and criminal justice issues, including
capital punishment.
In his opening statement to the Committee, Thomas attempted to
portray himself as fair, impartial, and not committed to any particular
ideology or agenda:
It is my hope that when these hearings are completed that this
committee will conclude that I am an honest, decent, fair person.
I believe that the obligations and responsibilities of a judge, in
essence, involve just such basic values. A judge must be fair and
impartial. A judge must not bring to his job, to the court, the
baggage of preconceived notions, of ideology, and certainly not an
agenda ....

20

At various points during his testimony, Thomas returned to this
theme, stressing that he was open minded and that he was not an
ideologue intent on pushing a particular agenda on the Supreme Court.
In response to questioning from Senator DeConcini of Arizona about
whether he agreed with the Court's three-tier approach to equal
protection analysis or whether he wanted to alter it, Thomas made this
general statement:

18. Apple, supra note 4, at Al.
19. PHELPS & WINTERNITZ, supra note 4, at 167-225.
20. Confirmation Hearings, supra note 17, at 110. Thomas added, "If confirmed by the
Senate, I pledge that I will preserve and protect our Constitution and carry with me the values
of my heritage: fairness, integrity, openmindedness, honesty, and hard work." Id. (emphasis
added).
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It is important for us, and I believe one of the Justices, whose name
I cannot recall right now, spoke about having to strip down, like a
runner, to eliminate agendas, to eliminate ideologies, and when one
becomes a judge, it is an amazing process, because that is precisely
what you start doing. You start putting the speeches away, you
start putting the policy statements away. You begin to decline
forming opinions in important areas that could come before the
court, because you want to be stripped down like a runner. So, I
have no agenda, Senator.21
In addition, when Wisconsin Senator Herbert Kohl pressed him
about the inconsistency of his testimony with the strong policy
positions that he had taken previously, Thomas explained that his
earlier positions were related to his offices2 2 in the executive branch
of government: "When I was in the political branch, I think I fought
,,2'He argued that because he was
the policymaking battles ..
currently serving as a federal appeals court judge, his record on the
appellate court was of more importance. However, Senator Kohl
continued to press him:
Why is it inappropriate for us to make an evaluation of your
candidacy based upon all the things that you have written and
said-particularly in view of the fact that you have been on the
[appeals] court for only 16 months? If we are going to make an
informed judgment on behalf of24the American people, why are your
policy positions not important?
In response, Thomas again argued that his policy positions were
advocated when he was a member of the executive branch, and
therefore should be discounted in his confirmation hearings for
Supreme Court Justice:
When one becomes a judge, the role changes, the roles change.
That is why it is different. You are no longer involved in those
[policymaking] battles. You are no longer running an agency. You
are no longer making policy. You are a judge. It is hard to explain,
perhaps, but you strive-rather than looking for policy positions,
you strive for impartiality. You begin to strip down from those
policy positions.. .. And I think that is the important message that

21. Id. at 203.
22. Thomas served as Assistant Secretary of Education for the Civil Rights Division from
1981-82, and as Chairman of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission from 1982-90.
MAYER & ABRAMSON, supra note 4, at 76-77, 116, 161.
23. Confirmation Hearings, supra note 17, at 264.
24. Id. at 266.
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I am trying to send to you; that, yes, my whole record is relevant,
but remember that that was as a policy maker not as a judge."
Much of the anxiety of opponents of the Thomas nomination
came from the belief that he would assist the conservative wing of the
Court in directly overturning important decisions regarding abortion,
school prayer, due process issues, and the like. 6 In his testimony,
however, Thomas emphasized his commitment to stare decisis, and the
importance of abiding by precedent even when in disagreement with
it: "I think overruling a case or reconsidering a case, Senator [Thurmond] is a very serious matter. Certainly, the case would have to
be-you would have to be of the view that a case is incorrectly
decided, but I think even that is not adequate."2 7 Moreover, he
maintained that a judge who wants to overturn a precedent has a
tremendous burden in demonstrating that such a drastic step is
28

necessary.

Near the end of his testimony, Judge Thomas again emphasized
that he would be open minded as a Supreme Court Justice: "In
specific areas, I have attempted to demonstrate, even when I have in
the policymaking area strongly held views, that I have always looked
to expand and to grow and to understand the counterarguments, not
to simply reinforce my own.""

III.

PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE

Clarence Thomas's effort to present himself as a nonideological,
open-minded judge was predictable in the sense that virtually all
judges and judicial nominees seek to portray themselves as possessing
the qualities of objectivity and neutrality. ° However, Thomas's

25. Id. at 267.
26. See PHELPS & WINTERNITZ, supra note 4, at 163-65.
27. Confirmation Hearings, supra note 17, at 134-35.
28. According to Thomas,
There are some cases that you may not agree with that should not be overruled.
Stare decisis provides continuity to our system, it provides predictability, and in our
process of case-by-case decision making, I think it is a very important and critical
concept, and I think that a judge has the burden. A judge that wants to reconsider a
case and certainly one who wants to overrule a case has the burden of demonstrating
that not only is the case incorrect, but that it would be appropriate, in view of stare
decisis, to make that additional step of overruling that case.
Id. at 135.
29. Id. at 494.
30. For example, as a Supreme Court nominee, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg declared that
she was "neither liberal nor conservative." Neil Lewis, Ginsburg PromisesJudicial Restraintif She
Joins Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1993, at Al, A3. Ginsburg has proved dissimilar to Thomas,
whose first-term performance immediately established his membership in the Court's most
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persistent efforts to repudiate his prior record of public statements,
writings, and speeches was unprecedented3 1 and provided a basis for
questioning both Thomas's veracity and his likely performance on the
bench. Despite backing away from his prior statements, Thomas could
not avoid commenting in some way on the myriad of issues presented
to him in the Senators' questions. His responses to those questions,
when compared with his subsequent judicial decisions concerning the
same issues, provide a basis to assess his performance.
A.

Voting Behavior

Clarence Thomas characterized himself during his confirmation
hearings as open minded and free of agendas 2 If this characterization represented an accurate self-prediction about his judicial decisionmaking, one would expect Thomas's voting record to be moderate and
not identifiable with either a conservative or liberal position. After

conservative bloc. Christopher E. Smith & Scott P. Johnson, The First-Term Performance of
Justice Clarence Thomas, 76 JUDICATURE 172, 174 (1993). Ginsburg has been true to her word
by initially locating herself in the ideological center of the Court. Christopher E. Smith et al., The
First-Term Performance of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 78 JUDICATURE 74, 75-77 (1994).
31. Even in later confirmation hearings, Supreme Court nominees have, unlike Thomas,
answered questions regarding their prior record. For example, in her subsequent confirmation
hearings, Ginsburg remained true to her record as a litigator and scholar by endorsing a woman's
constitutional right to make choices about abortion and expressing continued support for an Equal
Rights Amendment to bar gender discrimination. Neil Lewis, Ginsburg Affirms Right of A
Woman to Have Abortion, N.Y. TIMEs, July 22, 1993, at Al, A21.
Similarly, although Justice David Souter avoided controversy during his confirmation hearings
and had no prior record of speeches and articles, he discussed in great detail various developments
in constitutional law. Linda Greenhouse, Souter Tacks Over Shoals, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1990,
at Al, B5. As one reporter noted, "Judge Souter displayed an easy familiarity with both legal
history and current Supreme Court cases. His answers were filled with details and citations,
sometimes more than the senators appeared to want." Id.
By contrast, Thomas often displayed glaring ignorance about constitutional law during his
confirmation hearings:
During the course of the hearings, Thomas's lack of understanding of constitutional
law was becoming abundantly apparent to those knowledgeable in this highly specialized
field.
In front of the crowd in the Senate Caucus Room, Thomas's most embarrassing
moments with constitutional law came while trying to respond to a question from
Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont about the most important cases decided by the
Supreme Court since his Yale law school days.
Thomas stumbled about, struggling to come up with some examples.
Thomas's performance made constitutional law professors of all stripes cringe.
PHELPS & WINTERNITZ, supra note 4, at 200-01.
32. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.

Doubting Thomas

1996]

examining data from his first three terms on the Court, however, one
finds that he voted in a consistently conservative manner.
As Table 1" indicates, for his first three terms combined,
Thomas edged out Chief Justice Rehnquist as the most conservative
member by supporting the government over individual rights claimants
in 72 percent of the Court's civil rights and liberties cases. Indeed, in
his first term, 1991-92, Thomas immediately had a conservative voting
record of 74 percent, second only to that of Justice Antonin Scalia, who
has been a crucial member of the conservative wing of the Court.34
Table 1
Voting Records in Civil Rights and
Liberties Cases*

Justices

1991-92

1992-93

1993-94

Average

Thomas
Rehnquist
Scalia
White
O'Connor
Kennedy
Ginsburg
Souter
Stevens
Blackmun

74
67
75
56
42
51

69
73
65
61
57
61

73
75
67
-65
52
48
40
33
27

72.0
71.7
69.0
58.5
54.7
54.7
48.0
40.7
25.7
25.3

--

--

39
20
27

43
24
22

Voting records of United States Supreme Court Justices in formallydecided civil rights and liberties cases, 1991 term through 1993 term
(Justices ranked from highest to lowest in terms of total percent
support for government versus individual rights claimants).

33. The data for Tables 1 and 2 are drawn from the United States Supreme Court Data
Base. See Jeffrey Segal & Harold Spaeth, Decisional Trends on the Warren and Burger Courts:
Results From the Supreme Court Data Base Project, 73 JUDICATURE 103 (1989). We express our
appreciation to Harold Spaeth of Michigan State University who organized the Data Base and
supervises its continuation, and to Thomas Hensley of Kent State University who helped to
identify and obtain appropriate information from the Data Base for this project.
34. See CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA AND THE SUPREME COURT'S
CONSERVATIVE MOMENT (1993).
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Table 2 illustrates that Thomas joined the conservative voting
bloc of Scalia and Rehnquist in his three initial terms. These Justices
voted together with extraordinary consistency in the Supreme Court's
civil rights and liberties cases. Under the stringent criteria applied in
empirical judicial studies, voting blocs in Table 2 are only those voting
pairs or larger groups who average 86 percent agreement or higher."
Table 2
Bloc Voting Analysis--Civil Rights and Liberties Cases*

Th

Re

Sc

Wh

0

Ke

Gi

So

St

BIP

' Bloc voting analysis of formally-decided civil rights and liberties cases, average annual
agreement rate for each pair of Justices, 1991 term through 1993 term.
t Th = Thomas, Re = Rehnquist, Sc = Scalia, Wh = White, 0 = O'Connor, Ke =
Kennedy, Gi = Ginsburg, So = Souter, St = Stevens, BI = Blackmun.

In general, these data show that Justice Thomas represented a
predictable conservative vote in his first three terms on the Court. Far
from being independent and nonideological, he immediately aligned
himself with the conservative wing upon his ascension to the high

35. Voting blocs are identified through the use of the Sprague Criterion, which is calculated
by subtracting the average agreement score for the entire Court from one hundred. JOHN
SPRAGUE, VOTING PATTERNS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 54 (1968).

The

resulting number is divided by two and then added to the Court average in order to establish the
threshold level for defining a bloc. Id. A bloc exists when the individual agreement scores for
a set of Justices exceed the threshold established by the Sprague Criterion calculation. Id.
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court.3 6 Thus, it appears that his critics were correct in doubting the
accuracy of his confirmation testimony about his judicial orientation,
at least as far as his voting record is concerned.
B. Abortion
1. Confirmation Testimony
One of the most controversial subjects during the confirmation
hearings was Thomas's views on abortion and the landmark decision
of Roe v. Wade.37 Upon repeated questioning, he refused to disclose
whether he agreed or disagreed with Roe, claiming that answering the
question would "leave the impression that [he] prejudged this
issue." 38 The following exchange between Thomas and Senator
Howard Metzenbaum of Ohio illustrates Thomas's refusal to answer
questions regarding Roe:
Senator METZENBAUM..

..

Do you believe-I am not asking

you to prejudge the case. I am just asking you whether you believe
that the Constitution protects a woman's right to choose to
terminate her pregnancy.
Judge THOMAS. Senator, as I noted yesterday, and I think we
all feel strongly in this country about our privacy-I do-I believe
the Constitution protects the right to privacy. And I have no reason
or agenda to prejudge the issue or to predispose to rule one way or
the other on the issue of abortion, which is a difficult issue.
Senator METZENBAUM. I am not asking you to prejudge it.

Just as you can respond-and I will get into some of the questions
to which you responded yesterday, both from Senators Thurmond,
Hatch, and Biden about matters that might come before the Court.
You certainly can express an opinion as to whether or not you
believe that a woman has a right to choose to terminate her
pregnancy without indicating how you expect to vote in any
particular case. And I am asking you to do that.

36. Smith & Johnson, supra note 30, at 177-78.
37. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). At the time of the Thomas nomination, four justices-Rehnquist,
White, Scalia, and Kennedy-were in favor of overturning Roe. Those Justices had indicated a
preference for the elimination of Roe in majority and concurring opinions in Webster v.
Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989). In fact, Rehnquist and White had dissented
in the original Roe decision and in the various abortion cases during the subsequent two decades.
Thus, the Thomas nomination was pivotal because he could potentially provide the fifth vote to
overrule Roe.
38. Confirmation Hearings, supra note 17, at 180.
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Judge THOMAS. Senator, I think to do that would seriously
compromise my ability to sit on a case of that importance and
involving that important issue."9

Senator Metzenbaum was not satisfied with this response, and he
continued-to no avail-to press Thomas for an answer."0
Later in the hearings, Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont asked
Thomas about a speech in which Thomas appeared to praise an article
about natural law that criticized the Court's decision in Roe.4
Thomas claimed that he had not read the article fully and was simply
using a part of the article to convince conservatives that natural law
principles could be applied to civil rights issues.42 Incredibly,
Thomas claimed that he never even discussed the Roe case, despite the
fact that he was in law school at the time it was decided, and it is one
of the most widely publicized and controversial cases ever decided by
the Supreme Court.43

39. Id. at 180-81.
40. Id. at 181. In response to Thomas's claim that he could not discuss the abortion issue,
Metzenbaum said,
I have some difficulty with that, Judge Thomas, and I am frank to tell you, because
yesterday you responded, when Senator Biden asked you if you supported the right to
privacy, validated in Moore v. City of East Cleveland [431 U.S. 494 (1977)], by agreeing
that the Court's rulings supported the notion of family as one of the most private
relationships we have in our country. That was one matter that might come before the
Court.
Id.
41. The article in question was Lewis Lehrman, The Declaration of Independence and the
Right to Life: One Leads Unmistakably from the Other, AMERICAN SPECTATOR, Apr. 1987, at
21-23.
42. When Leahy asked Thomas, "Had you read the article before you praised it?," Thomas
replied, "I think I skimmed it, Senator. My interest, again, was in the fact that he used the
notion or the concept of natural law, and my idea was to import that notion to something that I
was very interested in." Confirmation Hearings, supra note 17, at 219.
43. Here is the particular exchange:
Judge THOMAS. Because I was a married student and I worked, I did not spend
a lot of time around the law school doing what the other students enjoyed so much, and
that is debating all the current cases and all of the slip opinions. My schedule was such
that I went to classes and generally went to work and went home.
Senator LEAHY. Judge Thomas, I was a married law student who also worked, but
I also found, at least between classes, that we did discuss some of the law, and I am sure
you are not suggesting that there wasn't any discussion at any time of Roe v. Wade?
Judge THOMAS. Senator, I cannot remember personally engaging in those
discussions.
Senator LEAHY. OK.
Judge THOMAS. The groups that I met with at that time during my years in law
school were small study groups.
Senator LEAHY. Have you ever had discussion of Roe v. Wade, other than in this
room, in the 17 or 18 years it has been there?
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2. Judicial Decisions

For such organizations as the National Abortion Rights Action
League, the Fund for the Feminist Majority, the Women's Legal
Defense Fund, the National Women's Law Center, and Planned
Parenthood, there was little doubt that Clarence Thomas opposed a
woman's right to choose whether to have an abortion." Despite his
testimony that emphasized his purported lack of prior thinking about
abortion, these pro-choice groups feared that Thomas would join with
conservative Justices to overrule Roe.4"
While Roe has not yet been overruled, pro-choice advocates' fears
about Thomas's views have proved accurate. In his very first term on
the Court, he joined in the judgment in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey," a decision upholding several of Pennsylvania's abortion
regulations.
The statute challenged in Casey contained several
restrictions: (1) a detailed informed consent provision, (2) a twentyfour-hour waiting period, (3) a parental consent requirement for
minors, (4) a spousal notification requirement for married women, and
(5) detailed reporting and public disclosure requirements for physicians
who perform abortions.4 7 The Court upheld all of these restrictions
with the exception of the one requiring spousal notification.4"
Because there was no majority opinion, however, the decision was
complicated and fragmented. 4' Although five Justices-O'Connor,
Kennedy, Souter, Blackmun, and Stevens-refused to overrule Roe and
continued to use viability as the line for the most restrictive abortion
regulations,50 a moderate triumvirate of O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Judge THOMAS. Only, I guess, Senator, in the fact in the most general sense that
other individuals express concerns one way or the other, and you listen and you try to
be thoughtful. If you are asking me whether or not I have debated the contents of it,
that answer to that is no, Senator.
Confirmation Hearings, supra note 17, at 222.
44. Representatives from these groups presented statements and gave testimony in
opposition to Thomas's nomination at the confirmation hearings. See generally Confirmation
Hearings, supra note 17, at pts. 1 & 2.
45. See Marcia Coyle & Fred Stasser, Abortion Rights Activists See Hostile Thomas, NAT'L.
L.J., Mar. 23, 1992, at A5.
46. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
47. Id. at 2803.
48. Id. at 2829.
49. Four justices-Rehnquist, White, Scalia, and Thomas-voted to uphold all of the
provisions, id. at 2875, while a single justice-Blackmun-favored invalidating all of them. Id.
at 2845. Justice Stevens was in favor of upholding only the informed consent and reporting
requirements. Id. at 2843. The trio of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter determined the outcome
of this case. They voted to strike only the spousal notification requirement. Id. at 2830.
50. Id. at 2817-18.
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Souter abandoned Roe's trimester framework, replacing it with an
"undue burden" test."' The test is the same one suggested by
O'Connor nearly ten years earlier in Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health. 2
The new approach set forth by the moderate triumvirate was
unsatisfactory to Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Scalia,
and Thomas, who called for Roe to be explicitly overruled and for
abortion regulations to be examined only under the rational basis
test. 3 Writing for the four dissenters, Rehnquist argued,
We think . . .that the Court was mistaken in Roe when it

classified a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy as a
"fundamental right" that could be abridged only in a manner which
withstood "strict scrutiny."
In our view, authentic principles of stare decisis do not require

that any portion of the reasoning in Roe be kept intact.5 4
That Thomas joined this opinion so soon after his entrance on the
Court is all the more interesting given his passionate statement during
the confirmation hearings about the importance of adhering to
precedent. According to Thomas, merely deciding that a case was
decided incorrectly would not provide an adequate basis for overruling
that case.55
Even more striking than Thomas's decision to oppose Roe,
however, was his support for Justice Scalia's strident dissenting
opinion. Despite his claim to have never examined the issue of
abortion, Thomas evinced no reluctance to quickly and whole-heartedly
endorse an opinion that contained Scalia's characteristically strong and
sarcastic attacks on the majority position.56 Was the abortion issue
51. Id. at 2819. Under this standard, an abortion regulation is to be examined first to
determine whether it presents an "undue burden" on a pregnant woman's right to abortion, that
is, "if its purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an
abortion before the fetus attains viability." Id. at 2821. Regulations posing an undue burden may
be justified only by a compelling state interest. Id. If there is no undue burden, the state need
prove only a rational basis for the regulation to be upheld. Id.
52. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
53. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2860 (Rehnquist, J.,concurring and dissenting).
54. Id. at 2860-61.
55. Confirmation Hearings, supra note 17, at 134-35.
56. Scalia often writes dissenting opinions that sarcastically attack the majority. See
Christopher E. Smith, Justice Antonin Scalia and the Institutions of American Government, 25
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 783, 804-05 (1990) ("Other justices respond with sensitivity and
diplomacy to opposing viewpoints. Scalia's opinions, by contrast, evince the consistent confidence
and self-righteousness of a 'prophet' who possesses a clear, fixed vision of how cases should be
decided. In advocating this clear vision, Scalia [applies a] strident tone and concomitant penchant
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so clear-cut that upon an initial consideration Thomas could immediately adopt a strident position? For some other conservative Justices,
this was certainly not the case, as indicated by the more moderate,
evolving views of Justices O'Connor 7 and Kennedy."8 Thomas's
quick endorsement of a strong conservative position on abortion did
little to quell suspicions that he had already adopted such a position
but had intentionally hidden his views from the Senate and the
public.59

for attacking and condemning colleagues with whom he disagrees.
).
In Casey, Scalia
followed his characteristic approach. Scalia sarcastically declared,
The Imperial Judiciary lives. It is instructive to compare this Nietzschean vision
of us unelected, life-tenured judges-leading a Volk who will be "tested by following,"
and whose very "belief in themselves" is mystically bound up in their "understanding"
of a Court that "speak[s] before all others for their constitutional ideals"-with the
somewhat more modest role envisioned for these lawyers by the Founders.
Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2882 (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting).
57. O'Connor's initial examination of the abortion issue led her to criticize Roe's reliance
on extant medical knowledge in the trimester framework, but she did not urge reversal of Roe.
Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
58. Kennedy joined Rehnquist's opinion in Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S.
Ct. 3040 (1989), that criticized Roe, but later decided in Casey that the right to choice for abortion
should be preserved. See Christopher E. Smith, Supreme Court Surprise: Justice Anthony
Kennedy's Move Toward Moderation, 45 OKLA. L. REV. 459, 465-68 (1992).
59. Ironically, Thomas's own mother later undercut his credibility by telling reporters that
Thomas possessed a definite viewpoint on abortion: "Thomas's mother, Leola Williams,
remembered clearly that she and Thomas discussed the issue and that his opinion was based on
her experience. He opposed abortion on demand, she said he told her, because 'if you had one,
where would I be?"' MAYER & ABRAMSON, supra note 4, at 67.
Thomas's veracity and credibility were further weakened by his behavior after the
confirmation fight. His continuing associations with conservative political activists portrayed him
as someone who shared their values and interests. After he was confirmed, Thomas reportedly
acted like a politician in showing his appreciation to conservative groups, including anti-abortion
groups, for supporting him:
The few public appearances Thomas made during the months that followed raised
even more questions about his sensitivity to judicial codes of conduct. Like a victorious
candidate, Thomas paid a round of thank-you calls to the conservative groups that had
helped him win [confirmation].
...Thomas also paid several courtesy calls to the political activist Paul Weyrich,
the founding father of the New Right, whose aides, beginning with Tom Jipping, had
lobbied so hard to secure Thomas's seat for him. On three occasions the justice visited
Weyrich's headquarters at Free Congress Foundation, a center of anti-abortion, antipornography, and pro-school prayer activism ....
Although many of the justices appear publicly before legal groups and several have
been keynote speakers at events organized by the conservative Federalist Society,
Thomas's ties to Weyrich and other political activists who were taking sides on major
issues before the Court are unparalleled.
MAYER & ABRAMSON, supra note 4, at 355-56.
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C. Religious Liberties
1. Confirmation Testimony
Another area of controversy in recent years involves religious
liberties, so it was not surprising that the Committee questioned
Thomas about his views on Supreme Court decisions involving both
the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. The Committee's
primary questions involved the doctrinal tests used by the Court to
decide such cases.
With respect to the Free Exercise Clause, the Committee asked
Thomas about Employment Division v. Smith,6" the 1990 case in which
the Court significantly modified the strict scrutiny test that had been
applied for nearly two decades since Sherbert v. Verner. 1 Under
Sherbert, if a government policy was challenged as abridging the free
exercise of religion, the government had to show a compelling interest
in order to uphold the policy. Smith revised this standard, holding that
if a policy is not directed at religion-if it is neutral and generally
applicable-the government need demonstrate only a rational basis for
the policy to be upheld.62 This new precedent established by Smith
had the potential for lowering the protection accorded religious
freedom. When asked about his view of the appropriate test, Thomas
responded, "I have not thought through those particular approaches,
but I myself would be concerned that we did move away from an
approach that has been used for the past I guess several decades." 6
The Committee also asked Thomas about his views on the
Establishment Clause precedents and doctrine. Senators Paul Simon
of Illinois and Herbert Kohl of Wisconsin questioned him about his

60. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
61. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
62. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-80.
63. Confirmation Hearings, supra note 17, at 398. Senator Biden referred to the test
established in Smith as the Scalia approach. After Biden expressed his concerns about how this
approach could have a significant impact on religious freedom, Thomas indicated that this was
of concern to him as well:
And I guess my point is our concerns are the same, that any test which lessens the
protection I think is a matter of concern. The point I am making, though, in not being
absolutist is that I think it is best for me, as a sitting Federal judge, to take more time
and to think that through, but my concern about the approach taken by Justice Scalia is
that it may have the potential and could have the potential of lessening protection, and I
think the approach that we should take certainly is one that maximizes those protections.
Id. at 399 (emphasis added).
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knowledge of the Lemon test,64 and whether he thought that test was
appropriate. 6' The Lemon test aspires to uphold Thomas Jefferson's
"wall of separation" metaphor,66 and the application of Lemon usually
results in the invalidation of policies that allegedly involve government
in religious activities. The Supreme Court included several Justices
who were critical of the Lemon test, and Thomas's arrival created the
possibility that the test might be invalidated with potentially farreaching results, such as the return of organized prayer to public
schools.67 Thomas said that he was aware of both Lemon and the
"wall of separation" metaphor, and that he knew the Court had
experienced difficulty with decisionmaking in this area.6" Nonetheless, he expressed his general agreement with Lemon and the "wall of
separation" metaphor:
The Court has established the Lemon test to analyze the establishment clause cases, and I have no quarrel with that test.
The Court, of course, has had difficulty in applying the Lemon
test and is grappling with that as we sit here, I would assume, and
over the past few years, but the concept itself, the Jeffersonian wall
of separation, the Lemon test, neither of those do I quarrel with.69
2. Judicial Decisions
Supreme Court interpretations of the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses have long been subjects of analysis and debate.70 In
64. This test was established in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Under this test,

a policy does not violate the Establishment Clause if (1) it has a valid secular purpose; (2) its
primary effect neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) it does not require excessive
government entanglement with religion. Id. at 612-13.
65. Senator Simon said to Thomas, "I guess I have a twofold question: Number 1, are you
familiar with Lemon criteria? And, number 2, if you are, do you think they are reasonable criteria
that should be used in the future?" Confirmation Hearings, supra note 17, at 256. Senator Kohl
asked, "In your view, Judge, what is the current state of the law with regards to the establishment
clause of the first amendment?" Id. at 265.
66. According to Leonard Levy, "In a famous letter to the Baptist Association of Danbury,
Connecticut, President Jefferson spoke of the 'wall of separation' [between church and state]."
LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

181-82 (1986). This phrase, which implies that the First Amendment requires strict judicial
vigilance to insure that government and religion are kept as separate as possible, was used by the
Supreme Court in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947), and "the Court has
frequently quoted these words, with approval." LEVY, supra, at 124.
67. Christopher E. Smith & Linda Fry, Vigilance or Accommodation: The ChangingSupreme
Court and Religious Freedom, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 893, 918-33, 941 (1991).
68. Confirmation Hearings, supra note 17, at 265.
69. Id.
70.

See, e.g., ROBERT S. ALLEY, THE SUPREME COURT ON CHURCH AND STATE (1988);

PAUL KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION (1964); LEVY, supra note 66; LEO
PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM (1967).
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recent years, this interest has intensified as the Court's composition has
changed. The Justices have been both praised and criticized for
decisions that limit free exercise, especially for nonmainstream religious
groups,71 and for establishment decisions that appear to sanction
substantial government involvement with religion.72 Although the
conservative Rehnquist Court seemed poised to change jurisprudence
concerning religious freedom,73 Thomas's testimony at the confirmation hearings indicated that he endorsed liberal doctrines that had been
criticized by many of his supporters.
Although Thomas claimed during his confirmation hearings that
he was concerned about the Court's modification of the long-standing
Sherbert test in Smith,"4 in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City
of Hialeah,75 the first major free exercise case since Smith, Thomas
joined the majority opinion that endorsed Smith.
Similarly, although during his confirmation hearings Thomas
expressed his general support for the Lemon test, claiming to "have no
quarrel" with it,76 when called upon to decide Establishment Clause
cases as a Supreme Court Justice, Thomas joined two opinions that
strongly criticized Lemon and called for it to be overruled. In the 1992
case of Lee v. Weisman, 77 the Court held by a narrow five-to-four
vote that school-sponsored prayer at public school commencement
Thomas joined
ceremonies violates the Establishment Clause.7"
Justice Scalia's blistering dissent in which he emphasized the importance of prayer as a "prominent part of governmental ceremonies and
proclamations. ' 79 Moreover, the dissenting opinion ridiculed the
majority for its conclusion that the school district's sponsorship of the

71. See Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV.
1109 (1990).
72. See DAVID KAIRYS, WITH LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR SOME 110-27 (1993).
73. Smith & Fry, supra note 67, at 941.
74. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
75. 113 S.Ct. 2217 (1993). Justice Kennedy, the author of the majority opinion, wrote,
"[O1ur cases establish the general proposition that a law that is neutral and of general applicability
need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental
effect of burdening a particular religious practice." Id. at 2226 (citing Employment Div. v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872 (1990)).
76. Confirmation Hearings, supra note 17, at 265.
77. 112 S.Ct. 2649 (1992).
78. Id. at 2661.
79. Id. at 2679.
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prayer amounted to psychological coercion.8" Finally, Scalia took the
opportunity to express his distaste for the Lemon test:
Our religion-clause jurisprudence has become bedeviled (so to
speak) by reliance on formulaic abstractions that are not derived
from, but positively conflict with, our long-accepted constitutional
traditions. Foremost among these has been the so-called Lemon test,
which has received well-earned criticism from many members of this
Court. The Court today demonstrates the irrelevance of Lemon by
essentially ignoring it, and the interment of that case may be the one
happy by-product of the Court's otherwise lamentable decision."1
Thomas joined another Scalia opinion criticizing Lemon in Lamb's
Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District.2 In Lamb's
Chapel, the Court unanimously ruled that a school district policy
prohibiting the after-hours use of its school buildings by religious
groups while permitting such use by other community groups was a
violation of free speech. 3 In addition, the Court held that permitting
religious groups to use the buildings after school hours would not
violate the Establishment Clause or fail the Lemon test. 4 While
agreeing with the general conclusion of no Establishment Clause
violation, Justices Scalia and Thomas expressed their regret over the
application of Lemon:
As to the Court's invocation of the Lemon test: Like some
ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave
and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon
stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again.
For my part, I agree with the long list of constitutional
scholars who have criticized Lemon and bemoaned the strange
Establishment Clause geometry of crooked lines and wavering
shapes its intermittent use has produced. I will decline to apply

80. Justice Kennedy wrote,
The undeniable fact is that the school district's supervision and control of a high school
graduation ceremony places public pressure, as well as peer pressure, on attending

students to stand as a group or, at least, maintain respectful silence during the
Invocation and Benediction. This pressure, though subtle and indirect, can be as real
as any overt compulsion.
Id. at 2658.
81. Id. at 2685 (citations omitted).
82.

113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993).

83. Id. at 2148.
84. Id.
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Lemon-whether it validates or invalidates the government action in
question .... "
Thomas's consistent support for this viewpoint appears to be in direct
conflict with his earlier confirmation testimony.
D.

Criminal Justice Issues

1. Confirmation Testimony
During the confirmation hearings, the members of the Committee
probed Thomas about capital punishment and the general due process
rights of criminal defendants. In response, Thomas expressed concern
about these issues. For example, when Senator Strom Thurmond
asked him how he felt about limiting the number of post-trial appeals
in death penalty cases, Thomas replied,
The death penalty is the harshest penalty that can be imposed, and
it is certainly one that is unchangeable. And we should be most
concerned about providing all the rights and all the due process that
can be provided and should be provided to individuals who may
face that kind of a consequence.8 6
Later in the hearings, Senator Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania asked him
specifically whether he would have any problem in upholding
application of the death penalty. He responded,
Philosophically, Senator, there is nothing that would bother me
personally about upholding it in appropriate cases. My concern, of
course, would always be that we provide all of the available
protections and accord all of the protections available to a criminal
87
defendant who is exposed to or sentenced to the death penalty.
Specter then noted that there were legislative proposals to place a time
limit on the Supreme Court's hearing of death penalty cases, and he
asked Thomas whether a ninety-day time limit was reasonable.8
Thomas said he did not know whether ninety days was appropriate and
85. Id. at 2149-50 (citations omitted).
86. Confirmation Hearings, supra note 17, at 133. Thomas continued,
I would be concerned, of course, that we would move too fast, that if we eliminate
some of the protection that perhaps we may deprive that individual of his life without
due process. So I would be in favor of reasonable restrictions on procedures, but not
to the point that individuals-or I believe that there should be reasonable restrictions
at some point, but not to the point that an individual is deprived of his constitutional
protections.

Id.
87.
88.

Id. at 423.
Id. at 424.
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conceded that federal judges have often felt pressure to move these
types of cases along.89 After stating that ninety days may be too
short for some cases, he continued,
I would be reluctant to say that I endorse a particular cookiecutter approach, but at the same time, I have no alternative to offer
as to what is an appropriate length of time. But my concern would
always be that we do not put ourselves in the position of adopting
an approach that would ultimately in some way curtail the rights of
the criminal defendant."
One of the most dramatic moments during the hearings occurred
when Thomas indicated an identification with those caught up in the
criminal justice system. He said that his background made him
sensitive to their problems and concerns." This statement came in
response to a question from Senator Kohl about why he wanted to
become a Supreme Court Justice. After acknowledging that being a
Justice was a tremendous responsibility, he said that the position would
give him an "opportunity to serve," to give something back to the
community." Moreover, he claimed,
You know, on my current court [the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit] I have occasion to
look out the window that faces C Street, and there are converted
buses that bring in the criminal defendants to our criminal justice
system, busload after busload. And you look out, and you say to
yourself, and I say to myself almost every day, But for the grace of
God there go I.
So you feel that you have the same fate, or could have, as
those individuals. So I can walk in their shoes, and I can bring
something different to the Court. And I think it is a tremendous
responsibility, and it is a humbling responsibility; and it is one that,
if confirmed, I will carry out to the best of my ability."
2.

Judicial Decisions

Contrary to his confirmation testimony of identification with
those in the criminal justice system and concern for protecting their
due process rights, Justice Thomas has appeared less concerned than
other Justices about the constitutional rights of criminal defendants.

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 260.
Id.
Id.
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For example, among all Justices serving on the Supreme Court
between 1986 and 1993, Thomas was the least likely to support
individuals' claims in Eighth Amendment, capital punishment, and
habeas corpus cases.94 In his first term on the Court, Thomas wrote
a dissent that criticized prisoners' rights. In Hudson v. McMillian,9"
the Court ruled that the use of excessive force by prison guards against
an inmate violated the Eighth Amendment ban against cruel and
even though the beating did not result in
unusual punishment
"significant injury.'"9 Writing in dissent for himself and Justice
Scalia, Thomas wrote,
Today's expansion of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause beyond all bounds of history and precedent is, I suspect, yet
another manifestation of the pervasive view that the Federal
Constitution must address all ills in our society. Abusive behavior
by prison guards is deplorable conduct that properly evokes outrage
and contempt. But that does not mean that it is invariably
unconstitutional. The Eighth Amendment is not, and 7should not
be turned into, a National Code of Prison Regulation.1
In Thomas's view, the prevention and punishment of abusive conduct
by prison guards should be left to state law.9" This view appears to
be at odds with the strong sensitivity to the rights of defendants and
prisoners that he evinced during his confirmation.
One year later, in Helling v. McKinney,99 Thomas again moved
away from his confirmation testimony, reiterating his view that the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause should not apply to anything
except the sentencing decision itself. In Helling, the seven-Justice
majority held that prison inmates could raise an Eighth Amendment
claim that involuntary exposure to second-hand tobacco smoke exposed

94. Thomas supported the government in 94% of such cases. This contrasts with the more
modest support for the government manifested by stalwart conservatives Justices Byron White
(68%) and Sandra O'Connor (64%), and is quite different from the voting record of his
predecessor, Justice Thurgood Marshall, who never supported the government in such cases
during this time period. Christopher E. Smith, The Constitution and Criminal Punishment: The
Emerging Visions of Justices Scalia and Thomas, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 593, 597 (1995).
95. 503 U.S. 1 (1992).
96. See id. at 11. Keith Hudson, while handcuffed and shackled, had been beaten by two
guards, and the beating resulted in loosened teeth, facial swelling, a split lip, and a cracked dental
plate. The beating was witnessed by a supervisor who told the guards not to "have too much
fun." Id. at 4. A lower court had ruled that the injuries sustained by Hudson were minor. Id.
at 5.
97. Id. at 28.
98. Id.
99. 113 S.Ct. 2475 (1993).
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them to unreasonable health risks.'
Writing in dissent, Thomas
argued, "[A]lthough the evidence is not overwhelming, I believe that
the text and history of the Eighth Amendment, together with the
decisions interpreting it, support the view that judges or juries-but
not jailers-impose 'punishment.".'' . Continuing his criticism of the
Court's decisions in this area, he stressed,
To state a claim under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause, a party must prove not only that the challenged conduct was
both cruel and unusual, but also that it constitutes punishment. The
text and history of the Eighth Amendment, together with pre-Estelle
precedent, raise substantial doubts in my mind that the Eighth
Amendment proscribes a prison deprivation that is not inflicted as
part of a sentence. And Estelle itself has not dispelled these
doubts. 102
In Helling, Thomas and Scalia "established themselves as advocates for
a return to the 'hands-off judicial policy of yesteryear with respect
to
10 3
prison conditions and the treatment of convicted offenders.'
Justice Thomas also moved away from his confirmation testimony
when addressing death penalty issues. At the hearings, Thomas
stressed the necessity of maintaining careful procedures in order to
protect the constitutional rights of defendants facing the death
penalty.' °4 Nonetheless, on the Court he has been a leader in the
conservative Justices' efforts to limit convicted offenders' access to
federal judicial review.
For example, on behalf of himself, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and
Justice Scalia, Thomas authored the plurality opinion in Wright v.
West,"M which advocated a rule requiring broad federal court deference to decisions by state courts in habeas corpus cases. The
deferential approach advocated by Thomas represents a more severe
restriction on post-conviction proceedings than those advocated by

100. Id. at 2481.
101. Id. at 2484.
102. Id. at 2485. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), the case referenced by Thomas,
concerned a prisoner's claim that a correctional institution's provision of inadequate medical care
constituted a violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments.
In Estelle, the Court determined that while inadequate care could violate the Eighth Amendment,
a violation would occur only if corrections officials manifested deliberate indifference to the
prisoner's condition and care. Id. at 105.
103. Smith, supra note 94, at 603.
104. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
105. 112 S. Ct. 2482 (1992).
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limits on habeas
most other Justices and effectively places strong
10 6
petitioners' access to review by federal courts.
Further illustrating a departure from his confirmation testimony,
Thomas joined Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Herrera
v. Collins, °7 which held that despite new evidence purporting to
show innocence, defendants sentenced to death are not ordinarily
entitled to new trials. Rather they must also show evidence of an
independent constitutional error in state court proceedings. °8
According to the majority, the proper remedy in cases asserting new
evidence of innocence is executive clemency. 9 Although Rehnquist's opinion recognized possible exceptions to this general rule,
Thomas joined Scalia's concurrence, which refused to concede that
there are any situations where evidence of innocence is so overwhelming that federal habeas relief is warranted. According to this concurrence, "There isno basis in text, tradition, or even in contemporary
practice (if that were enough), for finding in the Constitution a right
to demand judicial consideration of newly'1discovered evidence of
innocence brought forward after conviction. 10
In McFarland v. Scott,"' Thomas again backed away from his
confirmation testimony by dissenting from the majority's interpretation
of a federal law that created a right to counsel in federal habeas corpus
proceedings for capital defendants convicted of certain drug offenses. 112 The majority rejected the lower court ruling that the law did
not require the appointment of counsel until after the habeas petition
had been filed, and that it prohibited judges from entering stays of
executions in the meantime." 3 According to Justice Blackmun's
majority opinion, the right to counsel in this context would be
meaningless unless (1) death row inmates received assistance in
preparing their habeas petitions, and (2) executions were stayed until
the petitions were filed." 4 Thomas, writing for himself, Chief
106. See Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2331, 2393-99
(1993).
107. 113 S.Ct. 853 (1993).
108. Id. at 869.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 874-75.
111. 114 S. Ct. 2568 (1994).
112. The law inquestion was the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, 21 U.S.C. § 848(e).
113. McFarland,114 S.Ct. at 2572.
114. Id. On the first point Blackmun noted,
Federal courts are authorized to dismiss summarily any habeas petition that appears
legally insufficient on its face, and to deny a stay of execution where a habeas petition
fails to raise a substantial federal claim .... Requiring an indigent capital petitioner
to proceed without counsel in order to obtain counsel thus would expose him to the
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Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Scalia, disagreed with both conclusions.
While acknowledging that "legal assistance prior to the filing of a
federal habeas petition can be very valuable to a prisoner, 11 Thomas claimed that it "does not compel the conclusion that Congress
intended the Federal Government to pay for it.' 1 16 Furthermore, he
argued that the majority's interpretation permitting federal judges to
stay executions until the habeas petitions were filed was much too
expansive. 117 Thomas's approach raises the specter of placing
condemned prisoners in a "Catch-22": Prisoners need an attorney to
help them file their habeas corpus petition, but they would not be
permitted to have an attorney appointed at public expense until after
the filing of the petition.
Although Thomas has supported the protection of rights for
criminal defendants in some cases, his support has often been limited
to unanimous cases in which Justices across the philosophical spectrum
share a consensus. 1 When the Justices are divided about a criminal
justice issue, Thomas usually sides with the government.1 9
As his judicial record shows, Justice Thomas has not translated
the empathic understanding of the criminally accused that he asserted
at his confirmation hearings into a concern for their constitutional
rights. Thomas's record has yet to show any indication that his
confirmation testimony accurately represented his views. Instead,
Thomas has demonstrated a rigid formalism that has produced harsh
consequences for defendants and prison inmates.120 Thomas's efforts

substantial risk that his habeas claims never would be heard on the merits.
Id. (citations omitted).
Regarding the stay of execution, Blackmun argued,
[T~he right to counsel necessarily includes a right for that counsel meaningfully to
research and present a defendant's habeas claims. Where this opportunity is not
afforded, "[aipproving the execution of a defendant before his [petition) is decided on
the merits would clearly be improper."
Id. at 2573 (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 889 (1983)).
115. Id. at 2578.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 2579-80.
118. See, e.g., Wilson v. Arkansas, 115 S. Ct. 1914 (1995) (unanimous decision recognizing
the common law "knock and announce" doctrine as part of the Fourth Amendment's
reasonableness requirement and therefore a barrier to "no-knock" searches in most cases).
119. See, e.g., Kyles v. Whitley, 115 S. Ct. 1555 (1995) (a five-to-four decision concerning
prosecutor's failure to reveal exculpatory evidence).
120. For example, despite a long history of abusive and inhuman conditions in American
prisons, LARRY BERKSON, THE CONCEPT OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 141-56

(1975), Thomas follows a rigid, originalist approach to the Eighth Amendment that would leave
the protection of convicted offenders "in the hands of the same elected legislative and executive
branches that created and maintained the civil rights violations in the first place." Christopher
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to prevent habeas petitioners from gaining access to federal court
review 121 clash with his purported concerns for due process.
Moreover, Thomas's efforts have contributed to a legal environment in which defendants whose constitutional rights were apparently
violated and about whom there are significant questions regarding
actual guilt face execution because they no longer have access to postconviction federal judicial review. 2 2 Thomas's rigid formalism has
even led him to naively assert that mandatory death sentences would
serve as a means to eliminate racial discrimination in sentencing."
Such a view reveals a complete misapprehension of the role of
cumulative discretionary decisions in determining outcomes of criminal
cases.' 24 Thus, Thomas's confirmation hearing claims of empathic
understanding toward people whose rights must be protected when
facing the government's prosecutorial machinery do not withstand
scrutiny of his record.
E.

Voting Rights

1. Confirmation Testimony
Another important area of inquiry during his confirmation
hearings involved voting rights, particularly Thomas's views about the
Supreme Court's interpretation and application of the Voting Rights

E. Smith, Federal Judges' Role in Prisoner Litigation: What's Necessary? What's Proper?, 70
JUDICATURE 144, 150 (1986). According to Thomas, "At a minimum, I believe that the original
meaning of 'punishment,' the silence in the historical record, and the 185 years of uniform
precedent shift the burden of persuasion to those who would apply the Eighth Amendment to
prison conditions. In my view, that burden has not been discharged." Helling v. McKinney, 113
S. Ct. 2475, 2484 (1993). This formalistic approach to the Eighth Amendment is out of step with
all of the other Justices except for Scalia. See id.; Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992).
121. See supra notes 105-106 and accompanying text.
122. Christopher E. Smith & Avis A. Jones, The Rehnquist Court's Activism and the Risk of
Injustice, 26 CONN. L. REV. 53, 66-75 (1993).
123. Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892, 904-06 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring).
124. A mandatory death penalty for first-degree murder would not eliminate discrimination
because prosecutors still use discretion to decide which defendants will be charged with firstdegree murder and juries still use discretion to decide which defendants will be convicted of firstdegree murder as opposed to some lesser offense. See, e.g., Christopher E. Smith, The Supreme
Court and Ethnicity, 69 OR. L. REV. 797, 830 (1990).
Prosecutors make subjective decisions, based upon a complex variety of factors, about
whether to seek the death penalty. Likewise, jurors make comparable subjective
decisions about whether to apply the death penalty. If they deliberately apply
discriminatory criteria, the defendant cannot challenge their decision unless the decision
makers openly express their biases. Moreover, in this complex, multi-step decisional
process, decision makers may unconsciously apply their prejudices, thus precluding any
possibility of proving the existence of discrimination.
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Act of 1965125 and its amendments. Senator Kennedy began the
questioning by referring to a speech given by Thomas in which he
seemed critical of the Court's treatment of voting rights cases.
Kennedy read a passage which Thomas had delivered at the TocqueVille Forum in April 1988:
Unfortunately, many of the Court's decisions in the area of voting
rights presuppose that blacks, whites, Hispanics, and other ethnic
groups will inevitably vote in blocs. Instead of looking at the right
to vote as an individual right, the Court has regarded the right as
protected when the individual racial or ethnic group has sufficient
clout.126

After quoting this passage, Kennedy asked Thomas to identify the
judicial decisions to which he was referring. Thomas replied that he
could not remember any specific decisions to which he may have been
referring, but that he was probably thinking about the "effects test,"
which involves an examination of the effects of various electoral
schemes on the voting rights of minorities.'2 7
Kennedy continued his questioning by referring to what he
thought were two of the most significant Supreme Court decisions
White v. Regester 2 s and Thornburg v.
interpreting the Act:
2
9
Gingles.' In both cases, the Court ruled that at-large districts had
the negative effect of diluting the voting strength of minorities
(Hispanics in White and African-Americans in Thornburg), and that
this adverse effect could violate the Voting Rights Act.13 When
Kennedy mentioned these cases, Thomas responded that he was merely
concerned that all-black or all-white districts might not necessarily be
beneficial for African-Americans. 3 ' He emphasized his concern that

125. 42 U.S.C. § 1973.
126. Confirmation Hearings, supra note 17, at 410.
127. Id. Supreme Court Justices have disagreed about whether violations of voting rights
should be determined through an effects test or through a test of intent. Under an effects test,
violations could be identified if the impact or effect of a policy concerning districting or voting
could be shown to dilute the electoral strength of minority voters. By contrast, a focus on intent
merely looks for demonstrable bias underlying the motivations of the officials who designed and
implemented the policy. LUCIUS J. BARKER & TWILEY W. BARKER, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND
THE CONSTITUTION 558 (7th ed. 1994).
128. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
129. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
130. White, 412 U.S. at 769; Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 77.
131. Confirmation Hearings, supra note 17, at 411.
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"minorities have the ability to vote and to have an effective participa'
tion in the political processes." 132
Kennedy then pressed Thomas on his earlier comments about the
effects test, asking what problems he could identify that stemmed from
the Court's holding. Thomas replied,
Well, I guess the only point that I was making, Senator, was
whether or not it was on-again, this is general-whether or not we
could really judge from the number of individuals who held office,
for example, how effective a person's voting rights were being
implemented or how effective the statute was implemented or how
effective 133the minorities were in participating in the political
process.
Not satisfied with these responses, Kennedy requested that
Thomas review his speeches and the relevant decisions in this area to
help recollect his particular concerns.'3 4 Returning to this topic later
in the hearings, Kennedy reread the quotation from the 1988 speech in
which Thomas alleged that the Court's voting rights decisions were
based incorrectly on the notion of bloc voting. Again referring to
White and Thornburg, Kennedy said the Court specifically rejected this
presupposition regarding bloc voting, and he contended that the
Justices' main concern in both cases was that at-large elections "were
being used to diminish and undermine the effectiveness of the rights
to vote" of African-Americans and Hispanics. 3 ' Kennedy questioned Thomas again about why he was so critical of these cases,
especially Thornburg. Thomas claimed that he was not referring to
specific cases, but was simply using the Voting Rights Act as an
example of the difficulties in reconciling individual rights with group
rights.
The point that I was trying to make was that-and it was
There was thinking, I
my-there was a school of thought.
remember, involving-being involved or reading about the debates
in the early 1980s about the Voting Rights Act that felt that the
early cases that presupposed or would lead to proportional represen-

Id. He continued,
My concerns were not intended to suggest that I was in any way opposed to voting
rights or concerned that we have them. I think they are critical, and I certainly have
been most supportive and felt that we should have been more aggressive in stating that
position during the Reagan years.
132.

Id.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 412.
Id.
Id. at 445.
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tation. It was that kind of mentality that I felt presupposed that
blacks would vote a particular way, that there was the stereotypes.
.. . But I was not, as I indicated, going through any cases and
specifically saying here is the precise language in that case, but
rather to that general school of thought that interpreted those cases
to require proportional representation.136
Thomas then acknowledged that the language in the Voting Rights Act
and its amendments preclude a requirement for proportional represen13 7
tation and that Thornburg clearly does not presuppose bloc voting.
Finally, he appeared to indicate his agreement with the Court's
decision in Thornburg. The following exchange illustrates this point:
Senator KENNEDY. The only point I raise is when you
mention here many of the Court's decisions, I was just trying in my
own mind-and recognizing the importance of voting rights, to find
in my own mind what were the areas of the Supreme Court
decisions in voting rights that you are most critical of. But I
understand now-and I would like to move on-that with regards
to White [v. Regester] and Thornburg[] [v. Gingles] that you support
certainly theirJudge THOMAS. I absolutely support the aggressive enforcement of voting rights laws and certainly support the results in those
cases. I think I said that or attempted to say that.
2.

Judicial Decisions

Despite Thomas's expressions of general support for the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 as well as for important precedents that broaden
the statute's application, as a Supreme Court Justice he has adopted a
position that narrows the interpretation and application of the Act.
The first hint that Thomas might not support a broad interpretation
of the Act came in Presley v. Etowah County Commission 39 when he
joined in the ruling which held that the Voting Rights Act did not
apply to changes in the organization and functions of government. In
Presley, the responsibilities of elected county commissioners had been

changed so that the power of newly elected black county commissioners decreased. 4 ° Moreover, in Miller v. Johnson, 4' Thomas's vote
was a decisive component of the five-member majority decision barring

136.
137.

Id. at

445-46.

Id. at 446.

138. Id.

139. 502 U.S. 491 (1992).
140. Id. at 497.
141.

115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995).
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the use of race as a predominant factor in drawing legislative districts.
Thomas's most significant and revealing action came in Holder v.
"
' in which he wrote a lengthy concurring opinion criticizing
Hall,43
the Court's broad interpretation of the Voting Rights Act and calling
for the reversal of Thornburg, the primary precedent in this area. He
contended that the Act was not meant to cover matters of districting
and vote dilution, but instead was aimed solely at devices used to
restrict or prevent persons from registering to vote. 44 Referring to
section 2(a) of the Act, he said that the terms "standard, practice, or
citizens'
procedure" mean only those "practices that affect minority
access to the ballot. Districting systems and electoral mechanisms that
may affect the 'weight' given to a ballot duly cast and counted are
simply beyond the purview of the Act."' 45 Therefore, according to
Thomas, Thornburg must be overruled because it is an incorrect and
inappropriate departure from that purpose:
[O]ur decision in [ Thornburgv.] Gingles interpreting the scope of § 2
was badly reasoned; it wholly substituted reliance on legislative
history for analysis of statutory text. In doing so, it produced a far
more expansive interpretation of § 2 than a careful reading of the
language of the statute would allow.'46

In a dramatic passage near the end of the opinion, Thomas called for
an immediate change in the Court's approach to deciding cases under
the Voting Rights Act:
In my view, our current practice should not continue. Not for
another Term, not until the next case, not for another day. The
disastrous implications of the policies we have adopted under the
Act are too grave; the dissembling in our approach to the Act too
damaging to the credibility of the federal judiciary. The "inherent

tension"-indeed, I would call it an irreconcilable conflict-between
the standards we have adopted for evaluating vote dilution claims
and the text of the Voting Rights Act would itself be sufficient in
my view to warrant overruling the interpretation of § 2 set out in
[Thornburg v.] Gingles. When that obvious conflict is combined
with the destructive effects our expansive reading of the Act has had
in involving the federal judiciary in the project of dividing the
Nation into racially segregated electoral districts, I can see no

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 2482.
114 S. Ct. 2581 (1994).
Id. at 2592.
Id. at 2603.
Id. at 2614.
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reasonable alternative to abandoning our current unfortunate
14 7
understanding of the Act.
Thomas's aggressive attack against Supreme Court interpretations
of the Voting Rights Act not only contradicts statements he made at
his confirmation hearings, it also constitutes the kind of judicial
activism that conservative jurists have long claimed to oppose. When
liberal Justice William Brennan retired, his critics regarded him as "the
worst kind of judicial activist, willing to substitute his whims for the
legislated preferences of the majority."' 48 With respect to the Voting
Rights Act cases, Thomas has done the same thing by challenging
doctrines that Congress has left in place.
Unlike constitutional
interpretation, in which the Supreme Court can freely reverse
precedents, statutory interpretation requires the Justices to defer to
Congress, the ultimate controller of statutory meaning.' 49 The Court
should interpret a statute's meaning and then leave it to the Legislature
to correct any misinterpretations.'
As Justice Thomas's opinion in
Holder shows, however, Thomas has not deferred to Congress with
respect to the Voting Rights Act.
Other Justices have even commented on this point. In Holder,
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Blackmun, Ginsburg, and Souter,
pointed out in a separate opinion focused solely on refuting Thomas's
views, "When a statute has been authoritatively, repeatedly, and
consistently construed for more than a quarter century, and when
Congress has reenacted and extended the statute several times with full
awareness of that construction, judges have an especially clear
obligation to obey settled law."''
Stevens labeled Thomas's views

as "radical"'5 2 and declared,
The large number of decisions that we would have to overrule
or reconsider, as well as the congressional reenactments discussed [in
the opinion], suggests that Justice THOMAS'[s] radical reinterpre-

147. Id. at 2618.
148. David Kaplan, A Master Builder, NEWSWEEK, July 30, 1990, at 19, 20.
149. See, e.g., LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 223 (3d ed. 1992) ("In the
interpretation of federal statutes, the Supreme Court's legal position is inferior to that of
Congress.").
150. [Wlhen the Court is asked to interpret a provision of a statute for the first time,
its job is to "fix the meaning of the words'-that is to interpret what the statute says
based on a literal reading of its text-and to determine its legislative history, which
requires the Court to decide what the legislators really meant ....
WILLIAM C. LOUTHAN, THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT:

THIRD BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 130 (1991).
151. Holder, 114 S. Ct. at 2629 (Stevens, J., separate opinion).
152. Id.

LAWMAKING IN THE

486
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tation of the Voting Rights Act is barred by the well-established
principle
that stare decisis has special force in the statutory are3
na.

15

Stevens characterized Thomas's analysis as a policy argument that
should be directed to Congress rather than persuasive legal reasoning
that justifies a dramatic jurisprudential shift." 4 Whether or not
Thomas ultimately succeeds in rewriting the interpretation of the
Voting Rights Act, it is clear that his confirmation testimony led
senators to believe his views on these issues were quite different than
what they have actually proved to be.
F

Equal Protection and Affirmative Action

1. Confirmation Testimony
During the confirmation process, Thomas presented as one of his
major qualifications the fact that he had overcome a difficult childhood
in the segregated South in order to become educated and successful.' 5
Specifically, he told the Committee that these childhood
experiences made him sensitive to the harms of discrimination and that
he would apply that sensitivity to his decisionmaking on the Supreme
Court. '56

Prior to his nomination, Thomas had spoken and written fairly
extensively on affirmative action. 7 His views in this area transformed over time. At first, Thomas seemed to be somewhat supportive of the use of affirmative action in remedying employment
discrimination. In a March 1983 speech he said,
Although my commitment to individual rights causes me to raise
questions about the effectiveness of group remedies, with the
exception of quotas, I support many affirmative action remedies. I
support these remedies because the remedies which are truly

153. Id.
154. Id. at 2625.
155. I watched as my grandfather was called "boy." I watched as my grandmother
suffered the indignity of being denied the use of a bathroom. But through it all they
remained fair, decent, good people. Fair in spite of the terrible contradictions in our
country.
...I follow in their footsteps and I have always tried to give back.
Confirmation Hearings, supra note 17, at 109.
156. Id. at 260.
157. See Speech to the General Meeting of Women Employed in Chicago, Illinois (Mar.
30, 1983); Speech to the Kansas City Bar Association (Apr. 28, 1983); Speech to the Cato
Institute (Apr. 23, 1987); Affirmative Action Goals and Timetables: Too Tough? Not Tough
Enough?, supra note 15; Civil Rights as a Principle Versus Civil Rights as an Interest, supra note 15.
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necessary to make individual rights a meaningful reality are not yet
on the books.15
By 1987, however, Thomas's views had changed. Thomas began to
criticize race-conscious and gender-conscious measures as unacceptable
methods of eradicating discrimination: "Goals and timetables, long a
popular rallying cry among some who claim to be concerned with the
right to equal employment opportunity, have become a sideshow in the
war on discrimination."' 1s9
During the confirmation hearings, a number of civil rights
organizations presented statements and testimony critical of Thomas's
nomination, particularly his opposition to affirmative action. 6 Upon
questioning from the members of the Committee, Thomas appeared to
soften his opposition to this discrimination remedy. He stated,
I have initiated affirmative action programs, I have supported
affirmative action programs. Whether or not I agree with all of
them I think is a matter of record. But the fact that I don't agree
with all of them does not mean that I am not a supporter of the
underlying effort. I am and have been my entire adult life.'
Later in the hearings, in a brief exchange with Senator Biden, Thomas
again expressed support for limited affirmative action policies.
The CHAIRMAN. ... I would like to make a point of
clarification. Did you say, Judge, that affirmative action preference
programs are all right as long as they are not based on race?
Judge THOMAS. I said that from a policy standpoint I agreed
with affirmative action policies that focused on disadvantaged
minorities and disadvantaged individuals in our society.162

158. Speech to the General Meeting of Women Employed in Chicago, Illinois, supra note
157.
159. Affirmative Action Goals and Timetables: Too Tough? Not Tough Enough?, supra note
15, at 402.
160. These organizations included the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law,
the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., the Leadership Conference on Civil
Rights, the Mexican-American Legal Defense and Education Fund, and the Center for
Constitutional Rights. See generally Confirmation Hearings, supra note 17, at pts 1 & 2.
161. Confirmation Hearings, supra note 17, at 263.
162. Id. at 363.

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 19:455

2. Judicial Decisions
a. Equal Protection and Affirmative Action
In his freshman term, Thomas participated in Georgia v.
McCollum,'6 3 an equal protection case concerning racially-motivated
uses of peremptory challenges by criminal defendants. Although
Thomas disagreed with the majority's conclusion that such challenges
should be barred, he concurred because he agreed with Chief Justice
Rehnquist's conclusion that the outcome was mandated by an
unchallenged recent precedent.16 4
Thomas's concurring opinion in McCollum is interesting for two
reasons. First, he openly acknowledged that "conscious and unconscious [racial] prejudice persists in our society and ... [c]ommon
experience and common sense confirm this understanding."' 65 In a
later case, however, he was among the majority that accepted a
pretextual explanation for a prosecutor's decision to remove AfricanAmerican jurors;' 66 the Court said that the prosecutor's 1race-neutral
67
explanations need not be "persuasive, or even plausible.'
Second, he effectively endorses the application of a race-based
remedy to address the consequences of racial prejudice upon jury
decisionmaking. He said that the Court had, in a previous case,
"reasonably surmised, without direct evidence in any particular case,
that all-white juries might judge black defendants unfairly.' 1 68 Thus
he was concerned that the elimination of black defendants' ability to
apply racially-motivated peremptory challenges would lead to racial
discrimination in the outcomes of criminal cases: "I am certain that
black criminal defendants will rue the day that this court ventured
down this road that inexorably will lead to the elimination of peremptory strikes.' 1 69 This position placed him completely at odds with
his predecessor, Justice Thurgood Marshall, who believed that

163. 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
164. Id. at 2359 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("A criminal defendant's use of peremptory strikes
cannot violate the Fourteenth Amendment because it does not involve state action. Yet, I agree
with the Court and THE CHIEF JUSTICE that our decision last term in Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., 11l S. Ct. 2077 (1991), governs this case and requires the opposite conclusion.
Because the respondents do not question Edmonson, I believe that we must accept its
consequences.").
165. Id. at 2360.
166. Purkett v. Elem, 115 S. Ct. 1769 (1995).
167. Id. at 1771.
168. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2360.
169. Id.
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peremptory challenges must be completely eliminated in order to
combat their discriminatory effects. 7 '
In other contexts, however, Thomas subsequently railed against
race-based remedies, revealing that he had either lost his sensitivity to
the continuing existence of discrimination or accepted such discrimination as the unremediable product of large social forces and private
In
decisions that should remain untouched by judicial decisions.'
adopting these positions, Thomas endorsed both the conservative
Justices' narrow definition of "state action" for equal protection
purposes and a vision of judicial restraint that would remove the courts
from an active role in addressing social problems. This formalist
stance raises questions about whether Thomas's confirmation hearing
statements claiming to support some kinds of affirmative action were
indeed accurate.
For example, in the Supreme Court's most important affirmative
action case during Thomas's tenure, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena,17 Thomas launched a vigorous assault against government
According to Thomas, "So-called
affirmative action programs.
'benign' discrimination teaches many [whites] that because of chronic
and apparently immutable handicaps, minorities cannot compete with
He also added that
them without their patronizing indulgence." '
"[t]he programs stamp minorities with a badge of inferiority.''174
Given the strident and categorical nature of Thomas's denunciations in Adarand, how could he have said in his confirmation hearings
that "from a policy standpoint I agreed with affirmative action policies
that focused on disadvantaged minorities and disadvantaged individuals
in our society"?17 1 If benign discrimination is inevitably stigmatizing
in such a harmful way, how could any affirmative action program be
acceptable to Thomas, even if the program could somehow be tailored
to benefit only those whom Thomas would identify as the truly
disadvantaged? Moreover, what became of Thomas's prior acknowledgment of the pervasiveness of "conscious and unconscious [racial]
prejudice" in American society with its concomitant discriminatory

170. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102-03 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("The
decision today will not end the racial discrimination that peremptories inject into the jury-selection
process. That goal can be accomplished only by eliminating peremptory challenges entirely.").
171. E.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995); Missouri v. Jenkins,
115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995).
172. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
173. Id. at 2119 (Thomas, J., concurring).
174. Id.
175. Confirmation Hearings, supra note 17, at 363.
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impacts? 176 Thomas merely applies his formalism for two propositions: (1) government race preferences are state action that cannot
and (2) such
withstand strict scrutiny in an equal protection analysis,
77
eradicated.1
be
must
and
minorities
harms
action
state
When juxtaposing this approach with Thomas's statements in
McCollum,'7 8 one can see that Thomas's narrow definition of state
action does not encompass racially discriminatory decisions made by
private actors in government-sponsored, government-designed, and
government- controlled legal processes.
Moreover, while Thomas apparently regards racial prejudice and
discrimination as a continuing, pervasive problem in society, he sees
stigmatization of minorities by governmental remedies as a more
significant problem. He may also regard pervasive societal discrimination as beyond the reach of governmental remedial authority in all but
the most formal settings, such as legal cases that provide a quantum of
proof of discrimination against specific individuals.
Racial Discriminationand Judicial Remedies
Thomas's views on equal protection issues came into sharper
focus in his concurring opinion in the school desegregation case,
Missouri v. Jenkins. 79 In joining the Court's majority to reject a
remedial order imposed by a district court judge upon the Kansas City,
Missouri, school system, Thomas seemed to regard judicial action in
desegregation cases as insulting to minorities. Because he apparently
saw such judicial policies, like affirmative action, as paternalistic, he
did not evince any recognition that such cases attempt to redress the
imbalance of resources devoted to the education of youngsters in
single-race schools:
b.

It never ceases to amaze me that the courts are so willing to
assume that anything that is predominantly black must be inferior.
Instead of focusing on remedying the harm done to those black
schoolchildren injured by segregation, the District Court here sought
to convert the Kansas City, Missouri, School District (KCMSD)
into a "magnet district" that would reverse the "white flight" caused
by desegregation."s

176. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2360 (Thomas, J., concurring).
177. Adarand Constructors, Inc., 115 S. Ct. at 2119 (Thomas, J., concurring).
178.

See supra text accompanying notes 163-169.

179. 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995).
180. Id. at 2061-62 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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The district court judge in Jenkins had issued many orders leading to
the construction of new schools and innovative educational programs.
Whether or not one believes such orders were excessive, Thomas did
not even see how those orders would remedy "the harm done to those
black schoolchildren injured by segregation..... Thomas criticized
the judge for finding that segregation even existed in Kansas City and
needed to be remedied. According to Thomas, the continued existence
of virtual single-race schools did not stem from illegal segregation that
should be remedied by a judge. Rather, "[t]he continuing 'racial
isolation' of schools after de jure segregation has ended may well reflect
voluntary housing choices or other private decisions." ' 2 Apparently,
Thomas believed that the judge should have done nothing at all absent
concrete evidence of specific discriminatory decisions, as opposed to
lingering discriminatory impacts.
Thomas's formalist thinking sees de jure segregation in very
limited terms and seems to ignore the role of housing discrimination
and other accumulated discriminatory impacts, which involve direct or
indirect government support, as remediable causes of discrimination."8 3 Unlike Professor Laurence Tribe, who argued that courts
should make at least symbolic statements condemning the government's role in ghettoization that produced continuing racial isolation
in schools,8 4 Thomas apparently accepts housing segregation as the
product of "choices or other private decisions" ' 5 and he believes that
it is beyond the practical ability of the federal courts to address
demographic patterns.186
Whether Thomas recognizes it or not, housing segregation is not
simply a product of voluntary choices by individuals regarding where
they want to live. It involves systematically-discriminatory steering,

181.
182.

Id. at 2061.

183.

See THOMAS F. PETTIGREW, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN THE UNITED STATES

Id. at 2062.

(1975).
184. Even if it would have had no impact on judicial remedies, a judicial proclamation
that inner city ghettoization was constitutionally infirm might have avoided legitimating
this nationwide travesty [of severe segregation in large cities]. Had the Court exerted
the one thing it clearly can control-its rights-declaration powers-to recognize the role
of law and of state action in creating ghettoization, the Court could at least have created
positive social and political tension, the sort of tension that makes kids grow up thinking
something is wrong, instead of inevitable, about ghettoization.
Laurence Tribe, The Curvature of ConstitutionalSpace: What Lawyers Can Learn From Modern
Physics, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1, 30 (1989) (footnote omitted).
185. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2062.
186. Id. at 2063.
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"red lining" by real estate agents and government-backed lenders," 7
and various governmental policy decisions' 8 -- hardly the kind of
"private decisions" the consequences of which should automatically be
immune from judicial scrutiny simply because they do not fit a narrow,
formalistic definition of "state action" for equal protection purposes.
Instead of viewing judicial power as one means for redressing-albeit incompletely-aspects of discrimination, Thomas merely
asks whether segregation is the product of patent state action, narrowly
defined, and then condemns the courts for acting at all. According to
Thomas, "The exercise of [judicial] authority has trampled upon
principles of federalism and the separation of powers and has freed
courts to pursue other agendas unrelated to the narrow purpose of
precisely remedying a constitutional harm."19 Thomas further stated
that judicial intervention into various issues constitutes "extravagant
uses of judicial power [that] are at odds with the history and tradition
of the equity power and the Framers' design."' 90
In Thomas's formalistic thinking, several points appear to stand
out: (1) private discrimination must be accepted; (2) housing
segregation and racial isolation in schools are a product of demographic
trends based on voluntary choices and private decisions that must be
accepted; (3) remediable discrimination will be recognized only in
narrow instances; (4) judges should leave to other branches of
government social problems which, ironically, were very often created
by those branches of government themselves;' 9' and (5) the protection of federalism, separation of powers, the tradition of equity power,
and the Framers' intentions are more important judicial goals than the

187. "Redlining is the practice of outlining in red on a city map an area where no
[mortgage] financing will be considered." GARY ORFIELD, MUST WE Bus?: SEGREGATED
SCHOOLS AND NATIONAL POLICY 81 n.12 (1978). Such practices were used by banks and real
estate agents, with the endorsement of the Federal Housing Agency, as a means to maintain racial
segregation in housing.

OLIVER C. Cox, RACE RELATIONS:

ELEMENTS AND SOCIAL

DYNAMICS 132-37 (1976).
188. See PETTIGREW, supra note 183, at 38 ("Residential separation by race does not
simply 'happen,' de facto; its structural roots have to be carefully planned and implemented.
Once established, the apartheid pattern is typically maintained by a vigilant exclusion of
prospective black residents in predominantly white areas.").
189. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2062.
190. Id. at 2067.
191. For example, if judges cannot issue orders to remedy racial isolation in schools, then
it is left to state legislatures, city councils, and school boards to remedy problems that they spent
decades fostering. In the analogous prison reform context, which Thomas also cites as an example
of judicial excess, id. at 2067, 2071, Thomas would place "the actualization of prisoners'
constitutional rights ... in the hands of the same elected legislative and executive branches that
created and maintained the civil rights violations in the first place." Smith, supra note 120, at
150.
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eradication of discrimination. According to Professor Tribe, "[Thomas] takes a more limited view than any other justice for the past 40
years of the proper scope of authority of a federal
court confronted
1 92
with a deliberate violation of the Constitution.'

Thomas's opinion went even further by criticizing the Supreme
Court's landmark decision in Brown v. Board of Education."'
Despite commentators' remarks that "[a]nybody who [opposed Brown]
today would be assailed as a segregationist crank,"' 9 4 Thomas
stepped forward as the first Justice ever to question the basis of
Brown.'
In particular, Thomas criticized the Brown decision's
famous reliance on Professor Kenneth Clark's studies showing the
psychological harms experienced by African-American children
subjected to segregated education in the South during the 1950s.'
According to Thomas,
[T]he court has read our cases to support the theory that black
students suffer an unspecified psychological harm from segregation
that retards their mental and educational development. This
approach not only relies on questionable social science research
rather than constitutional principle, but it also rests on an assumption of black inferiority."
What Thomas perceives as an "assumption of black inferiority" is
merely, in the minds of other observers, the recognition that the
unequal treatment and inferior resources attendant to enforced
separation was harmful to African-Americans-just as it would
be
198
harmful to any other group of children singled out in this way.
As one of Thomas's critics notes about his approach to issues of
racial discrimination, the Justice's written opinions
veer[] off into a neverland of color-blind philosophizing in which all
race-based policies, from Jim Crow laws designed to oppress
minorities to affirmative-action measures seeking to assist them, are
conflated into one morally and legally pernicious whole[, and thus]
192. Jack E. White, Uncle Tom Justice, TIME, June 26, 1995, at 36, 36.
193. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
194. Stuart Taylor, Jr., Meese v. Brennan: Who's Right About the Constitution?, NEW
REPUBLIC, Jan. 6 & 13, 1986, at 17, 20.
195. See White, supra note 192, at 36 ("This, notes Ted Shaw, the NAACP Legal Defense
and Education Fund lawyer who represented the plaintiffs in the Jenkins case, 'is probably the first
time a Supreme Court Justice has questioned the reasoning in Brown.').
196. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 315-20, 706 (1976).
197. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2062.
198. It was not separation per se that produced the harms, but rather the crushing
cumulative impacts of a society that provided fewer opportunities and resources, including
educational resources, for African-American students. KLUGER, supra note 196, at 319-20.
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[h]e heaps scorn on federal judges who have used the bench to
enforce and expand civil rights, accusing them of a paternalistic
belief in black inferiority.199
In addition, Thomas's elevation of constitutional principles, as
distinct from and superior to social science research,2.. raises questions about how he could possibly fulfill the message of his confirmation testimony, namely his purported ability to bring personal
experience and sensitivity to judicial decisionmaking on issues of
discrimination. If Thomas sees rigid constitutional principles as
excluding consideration of systematic evidence about social reality, then
how could he ever honestly purport, as he told the Committee, to
"bring something different to the Court [by] walk[ing] in the shoes of
the people who are affected by what the Court does"?2"1 Presumably, the anecdotal evidence of social reality reflecting his personal
experiences is even less valid than social science evidence. Based on
his simplistic conception and acceptance of housing segregation as, in
large part, an unremediable product of personal choice,2" 2 it appears
that Thomas's elevation of his putative constitutional principles has
completely overwhelmed any sensitivity to the reality of social forces
that shape society.
It is also disconcerting that Thomas has rejected social science
evidence on the impact of discrimination after having concluded that
in the jury context it can be "reasonably surmised, without direct
evidence in any particular case, that all-white juries might judge black
defendants unfairly."2 3 In the jury context, Thomas draws from his
unproven perception of social reality, while in other contexts he rejects
systematic studies of social reality. Such an approach raises the
possibility that Thomas selectively uses the concept of empirical
evidence to support his preferred philosophical position. If this is true,
it makes one wonder whether Thomas, like Scalia and others, will
ignore social science evidence in other contexts, such as racial
discrimination in the application of capital punishment.20 4

199. White, supra note 192, at 36.
200. For example, Thomas wrote that "[the lower courts should not be swayed by the easy
answers of social science, nor should they accept the findings, and the assumptions, of sociology
and psychology at the price of constitutional principle." Jenkins. 115 S. Ct. at 2066.
201. Confirmation Hearings, supra note 17, at 260.
202. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2062.
203. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2360.
204. See Dennis D. Dorin, Far Right of the Mainstream: Racism, Rights, and Remedies
From the Perspective of Justice Antonin Scalia's McCleskey Memorandum, 45 MERCER L. REV.
1035 (1994).
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In contrast to Thomas's presentation at his confirmation hearings,
his rigid, formal views on the narrow definition of remediable
discrimination and race-based policies seem to preclude support for any
affirmative action programs. Moreover, his defensive perception that
the identification of discrimination problems is the equivalent of
labeling African-Americans as inferior combines with his limited view
of federal judicial power to refute his confirmation claims that his
sensitivity to discrimination would shape his judicial decisions."' As
one analyst has noted, Thomas is not inclined to permit human
experience and humane sensitivity to affect his decisions because his
judicial voice "is a voice for a formal, even rigid approach to constitutional interpretation, a rejection of the idea that modern influences
might cast a new light on the intentions of the framers."2 6
IV.

CONCLUSION

Whether or not Thomas's confirmation testimony was purposefully deceptive, the evidence clearly shows that significant aspects of
his testimony are at odds with his record on the Court. He has not
proven to be an open-minded, independent thinker and, on such
controversial issues as abortion, voting rights, and affirmative action,
Thomas's views in Supreme Court cases have been consistent with his
controversial pre-Court speeches and writings rather than with the
disclaimers and explanations he presented during his confirmation
hearings. Did we see a genuine, honest Clarence Thomas at the 1991
confirmation hearings? In light of the intensive coaching that Thomas
received from Bush Administration officials before presenting his
testimony,207 it is not surprising that Thomas put a safe, positive
gloss on his responses to the Senators' questions. It is most troubling
and disappointing, however, that the nation's policies and future must
be affected by a judicial officer, steeped in the authority of the
country's highest court, whose judicial performance has been so quickly
and obviously out of step with his confirmation testimony. This was
no evolutionary process in which a judge developed new perspectives

205. See Confirmation Hearings, supra note 17, at 260.
206. David J. Garrow, On Race, It's Thomas v. an Old Ideal, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1995, at
El.
207. See Ruth Marcus, Haven't We Met Before? If You Liked the Souter Hearings, Then
You Loved the Thomas Replay, WASH. POST NAT'L WKLY. ED., Sept. 23-29, 1991, at 14 ("To
ready himself for the hearings, Judge Thomas reviewed videotapes of Souter's performance before
the Senate Judiciary Committee. That preparation clearly showed during Thomas' five days of
testimony, when the Souter hearings appeared to provide almost a playbook.").
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after spending time on the bench. 2°" Thomas did not move to a new
position from his original point. Instead, he moved back to his original
positions after telling the nation that he really stood on some other
ground as a judge.

208. See Christopher E. Smith & Kimberly A. Beuger, Clouds in the Crystal Ball:
PresidentialExpectations and the UnpredictableBehavior of Supreme Court Appointees, 27 AKRON
L. REV. 115, 120-24 (1993) (description of Justice Harry Blackmun's gradual transformation from
conservative to liberal).

